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Abstract
In this paper, we present a multi-period trading model in the style of Kyle (1985)’s
inside trading model, by assuming that there are at least two insiders in the market
with long-lived private information, under the requirement that each insider publicly
discloses his stock trades after the fact. Based on this model, we study the influences
of “public disclosure” and “competition among insiders” on the trading behaviors of
insiders. We find that the “competition among insiders” leads to higher effective price
and lower insiders’ profits, and the “public disclosure” makes each insider play a mixed
strategy in every round except the last one. An interesting find is that as the total
number of auctions goes to infinity, the market depth and the trading intensity at
the first auction are all constants with the requirement of “public disclosure”, while
the market depth at the first auction goes to zero and the trading intensity of the
first period goes to infinity without the requirement of “public disclosure”. Moreover,
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we give the exact speed of the revelation of the private information, and show that all
information is revealed immediately and the market depth goes to infinity immediately
as trading happens infinitely frequently.
Keywords. Incomplete competition; Asymmetric information; Insider trading; Price
discovery; Public disclosure.
JEL subject classifications: G14; G12
In the field of mathematical finance, lots of famous models are based on the assumption
that all traders in the market have the same information and the same expectation. However,
many financial and commodity markets can be characterized by a number of insiders, each
with the same or different information. How will an insider trade in the market? How
valuable is the private information to an insider? Moreover, how efficient are financial
markets at incorporating information? These interesting questions have generated a large
body of research, both theoretical and empirical.
In his pioneering and insightful paper, Kyle (1985) proposes a model pricing a risky
asset in the presence of new private information, and obtains a unique linear equilibrium
by assuming that the ex-ante asset value is normally distributed and the price is a linear
function of the aggregated market order. The monopolistic insider, in order to maximize his
conditional profit, will trade in a recursive manner in discrete model, while in continuous
time case when the time interval goes to zero, the private information is incorporated into
market price at a constant speed, and the market depth is constant over time. Based on
Kyle (1985)’s model, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) give a model in which there are
more than two informed traders in the market, and find that informed traders will trade
aggressively and the market depth becomes extremely large almost immediately. The only
difference between the two papers is that, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) assumes that
at least two insiders have the same information, and Kyle (1985) assumes that there is only
one monopoly insider in the market. The intuition lies in that, there is a trade-off of two
effects between information for one agent and that for others in multiple agents decision
games. Better information may improve an agent’s decision, but this may also cause other
agents’ decisions to strategically shift, and which in turn has an impact on the original agent’s
decisions. So, in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)’s model, each trader tries to beat the
others to the market, with the result that their information is revealed almost immediately.
Comparing these two papers we can get the conclusion that, the number of insiders has a
big influence on the market structure.
Now, Kyle (1985)’s model has been widely used to analyze microstructure of financial
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market and the value of information, and has elicited a large body of literature. For example,
Foster and Viswanathan (1996) also consider a market with multiple competing insiders, but
with the assumption that each informed trader’s initial information is a noisy estimate of the
long-term value of the asset, and the different signals received by informed traders can have
a variety of correlation structures. Back (1992) formalizes and extends Kyle (1985)’s model
by showing the existence of a unique equilibrium beyond the Gaussian-linear framework.
Remarkable, when the asset value has a log-normal distribution, the price process becomes
a geometric Brownian motion, as usually assumed in finance. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
analyze a strategic dynamic market order model. Their model is essentially a dynamic
repetition of a generalized version of the static model in Kyle (1985). However, their focus is
on intraday price and volume patterns. They attempt to explain the U-shape of the trading
volume and price changes, that is, the abnormal high trading volume and return variability
at the beginning and at the end of a trading day. When there exists public information, Luo
(2001) extends Kyle (1985)’s model by showing that, the monopoly insider put a negative
weight on the public information in formulating his optimal strategy. Recently, Caldentey
and Stacchetti (2010) study the extended Kyle (1985)’s model by assuming that an insider
continuously observes a signal that trackes the evolution of asset’s fundamental value and
the value of the asset is publicly revealed at a random time. Moreover, Chau and Vayanos
(2008), Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and Rochet and Vila (1994) etc. have used the variants
of Kyle’s model to analyze and to explain real financial phenomena.
In addition to the literature mentioned above, Huddart Hughes and Levine (2001) present
an insider’s equilibrium trading strategy in a multi-period rational expectations framework
based on Kyle (1985), given the requirement that the insider must publicly disclose his stock
trades after the fact. Just as Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001) say, under US securities
laws, insiders, such as officers directors and beneficial owners of five percent or more of equity
securities associated with a firm, must report to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) trades they make in the stock of that firm. These reports are filed after the trade
is completed, and are publicly available immediately upon receipt by the SEC. So it is
necessary and interesting to study the effect of “public disclosure” to the dynamic and
continuous trading strategy of informed traders. In their paper, they provide a solution to a
discrete time analog of Kyle (1985)’s rational expectations trading model, where an insider
endowed with long-lived private information must disclose the quantity he trades at the end
of each round of trading. They also find that the insider garbles the information conveyed
by his trade by playing a mixed strategy in every round except the last one. Nevertheless,
the public disclosure of the insider’s trades accelerates not only the price discovery process
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but also the trading intensity of the insider comparing with Kyle (1985)’s model.
Inspired by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Huddart Hughes and Levine (2001),
we consider a model in which there are at least two informed traders in the market, with
the requirement that insiders publicly disclose their stock trades after the fact. In this
paper, we consider the existence and the uniqueness of insiders’ equilibrium trading strategy
in a multi-period rational expectation framework and give the analysis of the equilibrium.
In equilibrium, the “trade public disclosure” and “competition among insiders” have great
effects on each insider’s trading intensity, the market depth and the effectiveness of the price.
Comparing with Holden and Subrahmanyan (1992)’s model, each insider plays a mixed
strategy in every round except the last one, because of the existence of “public disclosure”,
which also leads to the accelerated price discovery and higher market depths. Furthermore, in
the sequential auction equilibrium, market depths become infinite and all private information
is revealed immediately when the time interval between auctions approaches zero. The speed
of the revelation is faster than that of Holden and Subrahmanyan (1992), and we give the
exact speed of the revelation. Although market depth becomes infinite immediately, the
initial market depth in our model is a constant, as the total number of auction goes to
infinity. This is very different from that of Holden and Subrahmanyan (1992), where as the
number of trading rounds per unit time becomes larger, the market depth in the initial period
becomes larger. In Holden and Subrahmanyan (1992), the adverse selection is high in the
earlier periods because the information content of the order flow is high, and negligible in the
later periods because market makers have very little to fear from traders that have already
exploited most of their informational advantage. As the number of auctions is increased,
trading becomes more concentrated at earlier auctions and hence there is greater adverse
selection at these auctions. But under the requirement of “public disclosure”, market makers
know that insiders may disclose their trading and may choose a mixed strategy to dissimulate
their information, the adverse selection is the same at the initial auction even if the number
of auctions increases.
Related to Huddart Hughes and Levine (2001), “competition among insiders” leads to
more effectiveness of the price and lower profits of insiders. In particular, in the two-period
trading, the market depth of the first auction in our model is smaller than Hudart, Hughes
and Levine (2001)’s when the number of insiders is less than 5, however, the opposite con-
clusion holds if the number of insiders is more than 5. That is to say, whether market makers
set the marginal cost of the first period trades lower or higher depends on the number of in-
siders. If the number of insiders is big enough (bigger than 5), the adverse selection becomes
small.
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Moreover, we give the near-continuous trading results by starting with discrete time and
then taking the limit, rather than formulating the model directly in continuous time. When
the intervals between auctions becomes uniformly small, we give the expression of the error
variance of the price and the depth of the market depth at any positive time. We find that
the speed of insiders’ information incorporated into the price is a linear function of the time
t when there is one insider in the market. However, if there are more than two insiders, then
all information is revealed immediately and the market depth goes to infinity immediately
as the number of auctions goes to infinite where the market is strong-form efficient. An
interesting find is that as the total number of auction goes to infinity, the market depth and
the trading intensity at the first auction are all constants while Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) find that the market depth at the first auction goes to zero and the trading intensity
of the first period goes to infinity. The intuition for the contrast is that “public disclosure”
enable less adverse selection in the market.
Furthermore, from Section 2.2 to Section 2.4 in Gong and Zhou (2010), we know that
there exists an inconsistency between “constant pricing rule” in the definition of “linear
equilibrium” and the implication of “market efficiency” in Kyle (1985). In order to modify
the inconsistency, Gong and Zhou (2010) consider three different models according to the
insider’s attitudes regarding to risk, in which the basic assumptions of the model 2 are the
same as that of Kyle (1985). The analysis of model 2 and Theorem 4 in Gong and Zhou
(2010) imply that the equilibrium results of model 2 are the same as that of Kyle (1985),
as trading happens infinitely frequently. Therefore, using the same method to modify the
inconsistency as Gong and Zhou (2010) do, it is possible that we can get the similar results as
our paper when the trading happens infinitely frequently. But through preliminary research,
we know that the mixed strategy in game theory may be involved in the modified model,
which leads to very complex calculations. We will consider this problem in other papers,
and the purpose of this paper is to give the extension of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)
and Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001) using the framework of Kyle (1985) so as to compare
with the modified model.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the analysis of insid-
ers’ strategy and gives the two-period equilibrium of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)’s
model and that of our model with public disclosure requirement. Section 2 determines the
unique linear Nash equilibrium in multi-period rational expectations framework and gives
the analysis of the equilibrium. Section 3 considers the properties of the equilibrium when
the trading is carried out continuously. In particular, the exact convergence rate of error
variance is given in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper and Section 5 is the Appendix,
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which contains the proof of the theorem and some necessary propositions.
1 Analysis
1.1 Two-period Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)’s Model
In order to analysis the equilibrium strategy that every insider chooses in our model
we use the same structure as Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001), in which the equilibrium
strategy of a monopolist insider is given. Our starting point is a two-period discrete-time
model based on Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), with several informed traders who obtain
a signal about the value of a risky asset. Consider a standard Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) two-period model, in which there is one risky asset with a liquidation value, v, that
is normally distributed with prior mean p0 and prior variance Σ0. Let M denote the number
of informed traders, who are indexed by i = 1, · · ·M . Index the periods by n ∈ {1, 2}. Let
xn and xin denote the total order by all informed traders and the individual order by the
ith informed trader at the nth auction, respectively. Let pii1 and pii2 denote the portion of
insider i’s total profits directly attributable to his period 1 and period 2 trade, respectively.
Each informed trader learns v at the start of the first period and places an order to buy or
sell xin shares of the risky asset at the start of period n(n ∈ {1, 2}). Market makers receive
these orders along with those of liquidity traders whose exogenously-generated demands, µn,
are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2µ. Assume v, µ1 and µ2 are mutually
independent. At each auction, market makers observe only the total order flow yn = xn+µn,
but not each of them, and set the price pn, the price at the nth auction. We assume that
there is no discount across the two periods, that is, the interest rate is normalized to zero.
Equilibrium is defined by the market efficiency condition that pn equals to the expected
value of v conditional on the information available to the market makers at the nth auction,
by a profit maximization condition that each informed trader selects the optimal strategy
conditional on his conjectures and his information at each auction, and by a condition that
all conjectures are correct.
Let the insider i’s trading strategy and market makers’ pricing rule be sets of real-valued
functions Xi = {Xi1, Xi2} and P = {P1, P2} such that, given an initial price p0,
xi1 = Xi1(p0, v), xi2 = Xi2(P1, v), p1 = P1(y1), p2 = P2(y1, y2).
It is apparent that piin(xin, pn) = xin(v−pn). A sub-game perfect equilibrium is defined by Xi
and P such that, for all n ∈ {1, 2}, i = 1, · · · ,M , and for any other strategy Xˆi = {Xˆi1, Xˆi2};
E[pii1(xi1, p1) + pii2(xi2, p2)|p0, v] ≥ E[pii1(xˆi1, p1) + pii2(xˆi2, p2)|p0, v],
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E[pii2(xi2, p2)|p0, p1, v] ≥ E[pii2(xˆi2, p2)|p0, p1, v];
and
p1 = E(v|y1); p2 = E(v|y1, y2).
Define Σ1 = V ar(v|y1) and Σ2 = V ar(v|y1, y2), which are measures of the informativeness
of prices. The proposition below is based on a special case of Proposition 1 in Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992).
Proposition 1.1. Given no public disclosure of insider trades, a two-period subgame perfect
linear equilibrium exists in which
xin = βn(v − pn−1), n ∈ {1, 2},
pn = pn−1 + λnyn, n ∈ {1, 2},
λ1 =
√
M(M + 1)2[(M + 1)2 − 2k]Σ0
[(M + 1)3 − 2kM ]σµ , λ2 =
1
σµ
√
MΣ0
(M + 1)3 − 2kM ,
β1 =
(M + 1)2 − 2k
λ1[(M + 1)3 − 2kM ] , β2 =
1
λ2(M + 1)
,
Σ1 =
(M + 1)2Σ0
(M + 1)3 − 2kM , Σ2 =
1
M + 1
Σ1 =
(M + 1)Σ0
(M + 1)3 − 2kM ,
where k
.
= λ1
λ2
, satisfies the equation
2Mk3 − (M + 1)3k2 − 2(M + 1)2k + (M + 1)4 = 0,
and 0 < k < (M+1)
2
2
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the above proposition provides a benchmark against which to compare an
equilibrium for the case where insiders’ trades in the first period are publicly disclosed.
1.2 Two-period model with public disclosure of insider trades
Using the same method by Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001), we can know that no
invertible trading strategy can be part of an equilibrium in this case, and we show that
an equilibrium exists, in which insiders’ first-period trade consists of an information-based
linear component, βi1, and a noise component, z1, where z1 is normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance σ2z1 , and independently with v and µ1. For market makers, public
disclosure of x1 allows them to update their beliefs from those formed on a basis of the first
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period order flow. In particular, let p∗1 = p0 + γ1x1 be the expected value of v given x1
and y1. Thus, E(v|x1, y1, p1) = E(v|x1). In turn, p∗1 replaces p1 in the second period price
p2 = p
∗
1 + λ2y2. This pricing rule is accepted by insiders because the cost of the information
that can bring profit to them is zero. Using the symmetry of strategy for each insider, it is
straightforward to show that, given linear pricing rule by market makers, the only possible
equilibrium among insiders is one in which they choose the same strategy. Accordingly, we
can take one insider to analysis. Here,we take the insider i.
Applying the principal of backward induction, we can write the insider i’s second pe-
riod optimization problem for given x11, x21, · · · , xM1 and p∗1 as xi2 ∈ argmaxxE[x(v −
p2)|x11, x21, · · · , xM1, p∗1, v], where
E[x(v − p2)|x11, x21, · · · , xM1, p∗1, v]
=[v − p∗1 − λ2x− λ2E(
∑
j 6=i
xj2|x11, x21, · · · , xM1, p∗1, v)]x. (1.1)
Solve the above maximization problem yields the maximizing value of x, which we denote
as xi2,
xi2 =
1
2λ2
(v − p∗1)−
1
2
E(
∑
j 6=i
xj2|x11, x21, · · · , xM1, p∗1, v). (1.2)
By the theory of solving linear equations, we know x12 = x22 = x32 = · · · = xM2. So
xi2 =
1
(M + 1)λ2
(v − p∗1), (1.3)
and
E[pii2(p
∗
1, v)|x11, x21, · · · , xM1, p∗1, v] =
1
(M + 1)2λ2
(v − p∗1)2. (1.4)
The second order condition is λ2 > 0.
Stepping back to the insider i’s first period optimization problem, we have
xi1 ∈ argmax
x
E[x(v − p1) + pii2(p∗1, v)|v],
where
E[x(v − p1) + pii2(p∗1, v)|v] = x[v − p0 − λ1x− λ1E(
∑
j 6=i
xj1|v)]
+
1
(M + 1)2λ2
(v − p0 − γ1x− γ1E(
∑
j 6=i
xj1|v))2,
(1.5)
the first order condition implies
v − p0 − 2λ1xi1 − λ1E(
∑
j 6=i
xj1|v)
+
−2γ1
(M + 1)2λ2
(v − p0 − γ1x11 − γ1E(
∑
j 6=i
xj1|v)) = 0.
(1.6)
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Also by the theory of solving linear equations, we have x11 = x21 = x31 = · · · = xM1, and(
1− 2γ1
(M + 1)2λ2
)
(v − p0) +
(
2Mγ21
(M + 1)2λ2
− (M + 1)λ1
)
xi1 = 0. (1.7)
The second order condition is
2Mγ21
(M + 1)2λ2
− (M + 1)λ1 ≤ 0.
If our proposed mixed trading strategy, xi1 = βi1(v− p0) + zi1, zi1 ∼ N(0, σ2z1), is to hold
in equilibrium, by (1.7) we can get that λ1,λ2, and γ1 satisfy λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, and
1− 2γ1
(M + 1)2λ2
= 0, (1.8)
2Mγ21
(M + 1)2λ2
− (M + 1)λ1 = 0. (1.9)
Combining (1.8) and (1.9) we have
λ2 =
2γ1
(M + 1)2
, (1.10)
λ1 =
Mγ1
M + 1
. (1.11)
The market efficient condition implies
p1 = E(v|y1) = p0 + λ1y1, p∗1 = E(v|x1) = p0 + γ1x1, p2 = E(v|y2, p∗1) = p∗1 + λ2y2, (1.12)
where y1 =
∑M
j=1 xi1+µ1, x1 =
∑M
j=1 xi1, y2 =
∑M
j=1 xi2+µ2. By the projection theorem for
normal random variables, we get
λ1 =
Cov(v, y1)
V ar(y1)
=
∑M
j=1 βi1Σ0
(
∑M
j=1 βi1)
2Σ0 +Mσ2z1 + σ
2
µ
, (1.13)
γ1 =
Cov(v, x1)
V ar(x1)
=
∑M
j=1 βi1Σ0
(
∑M
j=1 βi1)
2Σ0 +Mσ2z1
. (1.14)
In order to get the expression of λ2, consider
p2 − p∗1 = E(v − p∗1|y2) = E(v − p∗1|
M∑
j=1
βi2(v − p∗1) + µ2),
Using the projection theorem for normal random variables again, we have
λ2 =
∑M
j=1 βi2Σ1
(
∑M
j=1 β12)
2Σ1 + σ2µ
, (1.15)
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where
Σ1 = V ar(v|x1) = Σ0 − γ21((
M∑
j=1
βi1)
2Σ0 +Mσ
2
z1
). (1.16)
(1.11), (1.13) and (1.14) imply
M(β211Σ0 + σ
2
z1
) = σ2µ, λ1 =
Mβ11Σ0
(1 +M)σ2µ
. (1.17)
By (1.10), (1.16) and (1.17) we get
Σ1 = Σ0 − (M + 1)
4
4
λ22Mσ
2
µ, (1.18)
and (1.3) implies
β12 =
1
(M + 1)λ2
. (1.19)
Substituting this value for β2 into (1.15) yields
λ2 =
√
MΣ1
(M + 1)σµ
.
In turn, (1.18) reduces to
Σ1 = Σ0 − M
2(M + 1)2
4
Σ1. (1.20)
So it is easy to get that Σ1 =
4
4+M2(M+1)2
Σ0.
According to the above analysis, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2. There exists a unique linear equilibrium in the two-period setting with
public disclosure of insider trades, in which there are constants βi1, βi2, λ1, λ2, γ1 and Σ1,
characterized by the following:
xi1 = βi1(v − p0) + z1, xi2 = βi2(v − p∗1),
p1 = p0 + λ1y1, p2 = p
∗
1 + λ2y2, p
∗
1 = p0 + γ1x1,
Σ1 = V ar(v|y1, p1) = V ar(v|x1),
for all informed traders i = 1, · · · ,M . The constants βi1, βi2, λ1, λ2, γ1 and Σ1, satisfy:
λ1 =
M
σµ
√
MΣ0
4 +M2(M + 1)2
, λ2 =
2
(M + 1)σµ
√
MΣ0
4 +M2(M + 1)2
,
γ1 =
(M + 1)λ1
M
=
(M + 1)
σµ
√
MΣ0
4 +M2(M + 1)2
,
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βi1 = (M + 1)σµ
√
M
[4 +M2(M + 1)2]Σ0
, βi2 =
σµ
2
√
4 +M2(M + 1)2
MΣ0
,
σ2z1 = σ
2
µ −Mβ2i1Σ0 =
4σ2µ
[4 +M2(M + 1)2]
,
Σ1 =
4Σ0
4 +M2(M + 1)2
,
E[pii1] = E[xi1(v − p1)] = [4 +M
3(M + 1)2]
√
MΣ0σµ
[4 +M2(M + 1)2]
3
2
,
E[pii2] =
1
(M + 1)2λ2
Σ1 =
2
√
Σ0σµ
(M + 1)
√
M [[4 +M2(M + 1)2]
.
Analysis of the equilibrium: When M = 1, the above proposition is consistent
with Proposition 2 in Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001). Proposition 1.2 implies that
λ1 =
M(M+1)
2
λ2, so λ1 > λ2 when there are more than two insiders in the market, that is to say
the depth of the market of the first period becomes smaller than that of the second period as
the number of insiders increases. That is because the adverse selection is high in first period
as the number of insiders increases. Proposition 1.2 also implies βi1 < βi2, i = 1, 2 · · · ,M
which means that the trading intensity of the first period is lower than the second period.
This is consistent with the absence of a concern for the effect of trading in the last period
on future expected profits. Moreover, insiders set V ar(X1) = M
2β2i1Σ0 + M
2σ2z1 = Mσ
2
µ
(i = 1, 2 · · · ,M) to disguise their trading by liquidity traders.
The same exogenous parameters imply different values for the endogenous parameters
depending not only on whether insiders must disclose their traders after the fact but also on
the number of insiders. To distinguish the values, we add an upper bar to the endogenous
parameters in the case of Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001), and a tilde to the endogenous
parameters in the case of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992). The next proposition compares
the endogenous parameters across the case of one insider and at least two insiders.
Proposition 1.3. In the two-period setting, the endogenous parameters across the case of
our model and Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001)’s model satisfy:
λ1 > λ¯1, (2 ≤M ≤ 5)
λ1 < λ¯1, (M > 5)
and for all M , and i = 1, 2 · · · ,M
λ2 < λ¯2, βi1 < β¯1,
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βi2 > β¯2, Σ1 < Σ¯1,
E(pii1) < E(p¯i1), E(pii2) < E(p¯i2).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following proposition compares the endogenous parameters across the case of disclo-
sure and no disclosure. For convenience, we only analysis the case of M = 2.
Proposition 1.4. In the two-period setting, the endogenous parameters across the case of
our model and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)’s model satisfy:
λ1 < λ˜1, λ2 < λ˜2,
βi1 > β˜1, βi2 > β˜2,
Σ1 < Σ˜1,
for all i = 1, 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1.3 implies that, in the first auction, the market depth of our model is smaller
than Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001)’s when the number of insiders is less than 5, and
the case is inverse if the number of insiders is more than 5. That is to say, whether market
makers set the marginal cost of the first period trades lower or higher depends on the number
of insiders. If the number of insiders is bigger enough (bigger than 5), the adverse selection
becomes low. Proposition 1.3 also implies that βi1 < β¯1, i.e., every insider trades less
intensely than Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001)’s model because of competition. It is just
the competition that makes all the insiders want to reveal their private information in the first
trading period, resulting in a more price informative, i.e. Σ1 < Σ¯1. According to Proposition
1.4 we know that, if there are two insiders in the model, then market makers set the market
depth of first period trades higher with public disclosure than without, i.e. 1/λ1 > 1/λ˜1,
under the rational conjecture that some of insiders’ trades are randomly generated in the
former case. Every insider trades more intensely with public disclosure than without in the
first period, i.e. βi1 > β˜1. The measure of the informativeness of prices is smaller with public
disclosure than without, i.e. Σ1 < Σ˜1. It means that the price reflects more information
than without because of “public disclosure”.
Now we analysis the second period strategy. Because more information is incorporated
into the price in the first period, every insider trades more intensely than that of Hudart,
Hughes and Levine (2001)’s and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)’s in the second period,
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i.e. βi2 > β¯2, and βi2 > β˜2. Not surprisingly, the depth of the market is bigger than
that of Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001)’s and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)’s, i.e.
1/λ2 > 1/λ¯2, 1/λ2 > 1/λ˜2. So, we conclude that, “competition among insiders” along with
“public disclosure” have a great influence on the behavior of each insider and the market
structure.
2 A sequential auction equilibrium
In this section we generalize the model of two-period trading by examining a model
in which a number of trading rounds with public disclosure taking place sequentially. The
resulting dynamic model is structured so that the equilibrium price at each auction reflects
the information contained in the past and current order flow. Moreover, all insiders maximize
their expected profits in the equilibrium, taking into account their effect on price in both
the current auction and in the future auction.
A security is traded in N sequential and its value at the end of trading is denoted by v
which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean prior p0 and prior variance Σ0. Let
M denote the number of insiders, who are indexed by i = 1, · · · ,M. Each insider observes
the liquidation value in advance. We assume that the quantity traded by noise traders
at the nth auction is µn, which is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ
2
µ, and
µ1, · · · , µN , v are mutually independent. At the nth auction, trading is structure in two steps
as follows: In step one, insiders and noise traders choose their trader quantity. When doing
so, every insider observes v but not un. In step two, market makers determine the price pn
to clear the market, based on their information. Since, every insider is required to publicly
disclose his stock trades after the nth auction realized, he choose the mixed trading strategy
xin = βin(v − p∗n−1) + zn to dissimulate his private information, where zn is a sequence of
independent random variables, normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2zn (note
that σ2zN=0).
Let xn and xin denote the total order by all insiders and the individual order by the ith
insider at the nth auction respectively. And let piin denote the total expected profit of the
ith ionsider from positions acquired at all future auction n, · · · , N . Each risk neutral insider
determines his optimal trading strategy by a process of backward induction, in order to
maximize his expected profits given his conjectures about the trading strategies of the other
insiders. In the rational expectation equilibrium, the conjectures of each identical insider,
must be correct conditional on each trader’s information at each auction.
We now state a proposition which provides the difference equation system characterizing
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our equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1. In the economy with M (M ≥ 1) insiders , there exists a unique sub-game
perfect equilibrium and this equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium. In this equilibrium there
are constants βin, λn, αn, δn and Σn, characterized by the following:
xin = βin(v − p∗n−1) + zn, (2.21)
pn = p
∗
n−1 + λnyn, (2.22)
p∗n = p
∗
n−1 + γnxn, (2.23)
Σn = var(v|y1, · · · , yn), (2.24)
E{piin|p∗1, · · · , p∗n−1, p1, · · · , pn−1, v} = αn−1(v − p∗n−1)2 + δn−1, (2.25)
for all auctions n = 1, · · · , N and for all informed traders i = 1, · · · ,M .
Given p∗0 = p0, Σ0, the constants βin, λn, αn, δn and Σn are the unique solution to the
following difference equation system
αn−1 = βin(1− λnMβin) + αn(1− γnMβin)2, (2.26)
δn−1 =
M − 1
2(M + 1)
Mγnσ
2
zn
+ δn, (2.27)
βin =
(M + 1)λnσ
2
µ
MΣn−1
, (2.28)
λn =
M
2(M + 1)αn
, (2.29)
Σn = Σn−1 − (M + 1)
2
M
λ2nσ
2
µ, (2.30)
γn =
M + 1
M
λn, (2.31)
σ2zn = σ
2
µ −
λ2nσ
4
µ(M + 1)
2
MΣn−1
, (2.32)
for n = 1, · · · , N − 1. When n = N , we have
δN−1 = 0, αN−1 =
1
(M + 1)2λN
, βiN =
1
(M + 1)λN
, λN =
√
MΣN−1
(M + 1)σµ
, (2.33)
and δN = αN = ΣN = σ
2
zN
= 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Analysis of the equilibrium: In order to compare the imperfectly competitive case
to the monopolist case, and the public disclosure case to without public disclosure case, we
give a series of numerical simulations using Proposition 2.1 in our paper and Proposition 2
in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992).
We first compare the interesting parameters Σn and λn in our model with those of Hudart,
Hughes and Levine (2001)’s model. As in Kyle (1985), the parameters Σn and λn are inverse
measures of price efficiency and market depth, respectively.
Figure 1 plots the dynamic behavior of the liquidity parameter λn by holding constants
Σ0 = 1, σ
2
µ = 1, N = 10 fixed and varying the number of insiders for the cases of M = 1,
M = 2, M = 10 or M = 50. It indicates that when M = 1, i.e., there is a single insider
trader in the market, the liquidity parameter λn is constant, which is just the result of
Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001)’s model. When the number of insiders is more than two,
the liquidity parameter λn declines nearly to zero very rapidly through time. As the number
of insiders increases, the speed with which they drop increases dramatically. Note also in
Figure 1 the small λn in the initial periods when the number of insiders is large. The adverse
selection (measured by λn) is high in the early periods since the information content of the
order flow is high, and negligible in the later periods because market makers have very little
to fear from traders that have already exploited most of their informational advantage. As
the number of insiders is increased, trading volume becomes less at earlier auctions because of
“competition among insiders” and hence there is smaller adverse selection at these auctions.
This pattern is consistent with the speed with which information is revealed, measured by
Σn, which is plotted in Figure 2.
Figure 2 plots the dynamic behavior of the error variance of price Σn by holding constants
Σ0 = 1, σ
2
µ = 1, N = 20 fixed and varying the number of insiders for the cases of M = 1,
M = 2, M = 3 or M = 4. It indicates that Σn declines at a linear rate when M = 1, which
is consistent with the conclusion of Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001). As the liquidity
parameter λn, Σn also declines nearly to zero very rapidly through time. As the number
of insiders increases, the speed with which they drop increases dramatically. In fact, when
there are 3 insiders in the market, less than 5 percent of the information remains to be
revealed by the 1th auction. This is because the imperfectly competitive informed traders
cannot collude to exploit their rents slowly. The larger of the number of insiders is, the more
fierce of the competition among them.
Figure 3 and 4 plot λn and Σn in our model and in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)’s,
respectively, by holding constants Σ0 = 1, σ
2
µ = 1, M = 2 fixed and varying numbers of
auctions, N = 4, N = 20, or N = 50. In order to see the behavior of λn and Σn in our model
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Figure 1: Liquidity parameter λn over time for different values of M , the number of informed
traders. The number of auctions is fixed at N = 10 and the liquidity parameter at each auction is
plotted for different value of M , M = 1, M = 2, M = 10 or M = 50.
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Figure 2: The number of auctions is fixed at N = 10 and the error variance of price, Σn, is plotted
for different values of M , M = 1, M = 2, M = 3 or M = 4.
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Figure 3: This figure contrasts the liquidity parameter λn, (i) when the insider must disclose
each trade ex-post and (ii) when no such disclosures are made. The number of insiders is fixed
at M = 2 and the liquidity parameter at each auction is plotted for different value of N , N = 4,
N = 20, N = 50. N(HS) in the figure means the N in Holden and Subrahmanyam(1992) and
N(our) means the N in our model.
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Figure 4: This figure contrasts the error variance of price, Σn, in our model and in Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992)’s model, over time for different values of N , the number of trading rounds.
The number of insiders is fixed at M = 2 and the error variance of price at each auction is plotted
for different value of N , N = 4, N = 20, N = 50. N(HS) in the figure means the N in Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992) and N(our) means the N in our model.
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Figure 5: Liquidity parameter λn over time for different values of N , the number of trading
rounds. The number of insiders is fixed at M = 2 and the liquidity parameter at each auction is
plotted for different value of N , N = 4, N = 20, N = 40.
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Figure 6: The number of insiders is fixed at M = 2 and the error variance of price, Σn, is plotted
for different values of N , the number of auctions.
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clearly, Figure 5 and Figure 6 again plot the liquidity parameter and the error variance for
varying numbers of trading rounds, N = 4, N = 20, N = 50, respectively.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the contrast in the equilibria (i) when the insider must
disclose each trade ex-post, and (ii) when no such disclosure are made. Figure 3 illustrates
that when the number of trading rounds fixed, the liquidity parameter λn with public dis-
closure of insider trades is smaller than that without public disclosure. That is to say the
adverse selection is low because of “public disclosure”. Also, as the number of trading rounds
per unit time becomes larger, the λn of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) in the initial pe-
riods become larger, but it is not the case in our model, which is potted clearly in Figure 5.
In Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) the adverse selection (measured by λn) is high in the
earlier periods because the information content of the order flow is high, and negligible in the
later periods because market makers have very little to fear from traders that have already
exploited most of their informational advantage. As the number of auctions is increased,
trading becomes more concentrated at earlier auctions and hence there is greater adverse
selection at these auctions. But under the requirement of “public disclosure”, market makers
know that insiders may disclose their trading and may choose a mixed strategy to dissim-
ulate their information, the adverse selection is the same at the initial auction even if the
number of auctions increases.
Figure 4 illustrates that as the number of trading rounds per unit time becomes very
large, Σn declines nearly to zero very rapidly both in the case of “public disclosure” and
the case “without public disclosure”. And as the number of auctions increases, the speed
with which they drop increases dramatically. But when the number of trading rounds fixed,
the drop speed is faster under the requirement of “public disclosure”. That is to say, the
“public disclosure” and aggressive competition among insiders lead to most of the private
information to be incorporated into the price in the early auctions.
3 A convergence result–Near continuous trading
In this section, we will study the properties of the discrete model of sequential trading
when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small, and analyze the behavior of the
equilibrium when the market approaches continuous trading. Our main results, given in
Theorem 3.1, concern the behavior of the equilibrium when the market approaches contin-
uous trading. Unlike Back (1992) and Back, Cao, and Willard (2000) e.t.c formulating the
continuous time model directly, we use the discrete models to approach continuous model,
that is, use the discrete results Proposition 2.1 and then take the limit.
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We assume there is N auctions in the interval [0, 1], and the interval between auctions is
the same.
In order to get the continuous result we first give the following key proposition, the proof
of which is given in the appendix. 1
Proposition 3.1. For any fixed N , the sequence {an} described by the equation (5.79) satisfy
a2n−1
a2n
≤ 1 (3.34)
where 1 ≤ n ≤ N .
The following theory is one of our main results:
Theorem 3.1. As the interval between auctions in the discrete model becomes uniformly
small, (i.e.N → +∞), the parameters characterized by the unique sequential auction equi-
librium in Proposition 2.1 is convergent. More precisely, for any t ∈ (0, 1) 2, choose N1 <
N2 < · · · < Nj < · · · → +∞, and satisfy 2 + (1− t)Nj ≤ (1− t)Nj+1 < Nj − 1, j = 1, 2, · · · .
For every Nj, let n(Nj) = [tNj ], j = 1, · · · , where [x] denote the integer part of x. When
j → +∞, we have Σ(Nj)
n(Nj)
→ Σt, λ(Nj)n(Nj) → λt, β
(Nj)
in(Nj)
→ βit,σ(Nj)zn(Nj )
2 → σ2zt and
(i)When M = 1, Σt, λt, βit , σ
2
zt
satisfy
Σt = (1− t)Σ0, λt = 0,
βit = 0 (i = 1), σ
2
zt
= σ2µ.
(ii) When M ≥ 2, Σ(Nj )
n(Nj )
satisfies
exp
{
[tNj ] log
(
1− A
M
)
+ o(Nj)
}
≤
Σ
(Nj)
n(Nj)
Σ0
≤ exp
{
[tNj ] log
(
1− A
M
)}
(3.35)
i.e.
Σ
Nj
n(Nj )
Σ0
≈ exp {[tNj ] log (1− AM )}, and
lim
Nj→+∞
λ
(Nj)
1 =
√
Σ0A
(M + 1)σµ
, (3.36)
lim
Nj→+∞
β
(Nj)
1 =
Aσµ
M
√
Σ0
, (3.37)
1 The method that we used here to get the convergence result is different from the method used by Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Kyle (1985).
2 Because we assume that every inside trader must disclose his trading volume after the fact but not
verification afterward by others, every insider uses his information completely after the trade finished, i.e.
Σ1 = 0, λ1 = 0.
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furthermore, Σt, λt, βit , σ
2
zt
satisfy
Σt = 0, λt = 0,
βit = +∞, σ2zt =
σ2µ
M
(1− A
M
),
where A is the unique root of f(x)
.
= (M − 1)2x3 − 4(M + 1)(M − 1)2x2 + (M2 − 1)(6M2 −
4)x+ (M + 1)2(4M2 − 3M3) = 0 in (0,M).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 3.1 implies that, when M = 1, the speed of insiders’ information incorporated
into the price is a linear function of the time t. This is a limiting result of Hudart, Hughes
and Levine (2001). When M ≥ 2 , the speed of the insiders’ information is not incorporated
into the price is approximate a exponential function of the time [tNj ]. When j → +∞,
Σt = 0, λt = 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1), that is to say, as the number of auctions goes to infinity,
all information is revealed immediately and the market depth goes to infinity immediately.
These results described in Theorem 3.1 are consistent with the results numerical illustrated
in section 2.
But another class of limits (i.e. limNj→+∞ λ
(Nj)
1 =
√
Σ0A
(M+1)σµ
and limNj→+∞ β
(Nj)
1 =
Aσµ
M
√
Σ0
)
show that, as the total number of auction goes to infinity, the market depth at the first
auction is a constant, and the trading intensity is also a constant. However, Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992) find that the market depth at the first auction goes to zero and
trading intensity β1 goes to infinity. The intuition for the contrast is that “public disclosure”
enable higher adverse selection in the market.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a model in which there are at least two informed traders in
the market, with the requirement that insiders publicly disclose their stock trades after the
fact but not verification by others. In equilibrium, the “public disclosure” and “competition
among insiders”assumptions have great effects on each insider’s trading intensity, the market
depth and the effectiveness of the price.
We have shown that the contrast between our results and those of Hudart, Hughes and
Levine (2001) and the contrast between our results and those of Holden and Subrahmanyan
(1992) are far from trivial. In particular, in our model, as the interval between auctions ap-
proaches zero, the market approaches the perfectly competitive outcome of full information
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revelation and infinite market depth almost immediately, in contrast to the case of a monop-
olist considered by Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001), wherein market depth is constant at
all times and information is revealed at a linear speed. Moreover, in the two-period trading,
the market depth of the first auction in our model is smaller than Hudart, Hughes and Levine
(2001)’s when the number of insiders is less than 5, and the opposite conclusion holds if the
number of insiders is more than 5. That is to say, whether market makers set the marginal
cost of the first period traders lower or higher depends on the number of insiders. If the
number of insiders is big enough (bigger than 5), the adverse selection becomes small. Com-
paring with Holden and Subrahmanyan(1992)’s model, each insider plays a mixed strategy
in every round except the last one, because of the existence of “public disclosure”, leading
to the accelerated price discovery and higher market depths. Furthermore, in the sequential
auction equilibrium, market depths become infinite and all private information is revealed
immediately when the time interval between auctions approaches zero. The speed of the
revelation is faster than that of Holden and Subrahmanyan (1992), and we give the exact
speed of the revelation in Theorem 3.1.
Moreover, we give the near-continuous trading results by starting with discrete time and
then taking the limit, rather than formulating the model directly in continuous time. We
find that the speed of insiders’ information incorporated into the price is a linear function
of the time t (t ∈ (0, 1)) when there is one insider in the market. However, if there are more
than two insiders, the speed of the insiders’ information is not incorporated into the price
is approximate a exponential function of the time [tN ], where t ∈ (0, 1) is the time and
N is the total number of auctions in (0, 1). That is to say, when there are more than two
insiders in the market all information is revealed immediately and the market depth goes to
infinity immediately as the number of auctions goes to infinite where the market is strong-
form efficient. An interesting find is that as the total number of auction goes to infinity, the
market depth and the trading intensity at the first auction are all constants while Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992) find that the market depth at the first auction goes to zero and
the trading intensity of the first period goes to infinity. The intuition for the contrast is that
“public disclosure” enable less adverse selection in the market.
Our results have two important implications. Firstly, under the requirement of “public
disclosure”, the market can be close to strong-form efficiency even when the presence of just
two noncooperative privately informed traders is assumed. Secondly, despite being close to
efficiency, the market depth at the first auction is a constant. These implications are in
sharp contrast to previous literature.
Our model not only shows that insiders are able to profit from long-lived private infor-
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mation even though they must disclose their trades at the end of each trading, but also can
be applied to lots of intra-day phenomena, such as adverse selection problem and so on.
5 Appendix
We first recall a well-known regression result which will be used.
Lemma 5.1. Let X1 and X2 be two normal random vectors,
(
X1
X2
)
∼ N(µ,Σ) with
µ =
(
µ1
µ2
)
, Σ =
(
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
)
. Then the random variable X1 conditional on X2 has a
normal distribution. More precisely ,
E[X1|X2] = µ1 + Σ12Σ−122 (X2 − µ2), V ar(X1|X2) = Σ11 − Σ12Σ−122 Σ21.
Proof of Proposition 1.1: Let N in Proposition 1 of Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) equal 2 and ∆tn (n = 1, · · · , N.) equal 1, we have the following relationships :
α1 =
1− α2λ2
λ2[M(1− 2α2λ2) + 1]2 , (5.38)
α2 = 0, (5.39)
β1 =
1− 2α1λ1
λ1[M(1− 2α1λ1) + 1] , (5.40)
β2 =
1
λ2(M + 1)
, (5.41)
λ1 =
Mβ1Σ1
σ2µ
, (5.42)
λ2 =
1
σµ
(
MΣ2
M + 1
) 1
2
, (5.43)
Σ2 = (1−Mβ2λ2)Σ1, (5.44)
Σ1 = (1−Mβ1λ1)Σ0. (5.45)
Let k
.
= λ1
λ2
, from (5.38) and (5.39) we get
α1 =
1
λ2(M + 1)2
. (5.46)
Combining (5.40) and (5.46), we get the expression of β1
β1 =
1− 2k
(M+1)2
λ1[M(1 − 2k(M+1)2 ) + 1]
=
(M + 1)2 − 2k
λ1[(M + 1)3 − 2kM ] .
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The expression of β1 and (5.45) imply
Σ1 =
(
1− M(M + 1)
2 − 2kM
(M + 1)3 − 2kM
)
Σ0 =
(M + 1)2Σ0
(M + 1)3 − 2kM . (5.47)
(5.41),(5.44) and (5.47) give:
Σ2 =
1
M + 1
Σ1 =
(M + 1)Σ0
(M + 1)3 − 2kM . (5.48)
(5.42) and (5.47) imply:
λ21 =
M(M + 1)2[(M + 1)2 − 2k]Σ0
[(M + 1)3 − 2kM ]2σ2µ
. (5.49)
Combining (5.43) and (5.48)
λ22 =
1
σ2µ
MΣ0
(M + 1)3 − 2kM. (5.50)
From the above two equations it is easy to get
k2
.
=
λ21
λ22
=
(M + 1)2[(M + 1)2 − 2k]
(M + 1)3 − 2kM . (5.51)
The polynomial 2Mk3− (M +1)3k2− 2(M +1)2k+ (M +1)4 = 0 has three roots, but from
the second order condition of Proposition 1 in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), λ1 > 0,
λ2 > 0. It is easy to show that the polynomial only has one root satisfying conditions λ1 > 0
and λ2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.3: From Proposition 2 of Hudart, Hughes and Levine (2001),
we get
λ¯1 = λ¯2 =
1
2σµ
√
Σ0
2
,
β¯1 =
σµ√
2Σ0
, β¯2 =
√
2σµ√
Σ0
Σ¯1 =
1
2
Σ0.
So ,
λ1
λ¯1
=
√
8M3
4 +M2(M + 1)2
=
{
> 1, 2 ≤ M ≤ 5
< 1, M > 5
,
λ2
λ¯2
=
4
(M + 1)2
√
2M
[4 +M2(M + 1)2]
< 1,
βi1
β¯1
= (M + 1)
√
2M
4 +M2(M + 1)2
< 1,
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βi2
β¯2
=
√
4 +M2(M + 1)2
8M
> 1,
Σ1
Σ¯1
=
8
4 +M2(M + 1)2
< 1.
Proof of Proposition 1.4: Let the M in Proposition 1.1 equal 2, we have
λ˜1 =
√
2Σ0(1− 2k9 )
σµ(3− 4k9 )
, λ˜2 =
1
3σµ
√
2Σ0
3− 4k
9
,
β˜1 =
1− 2k
9
λ˜1(3− 4k9 )
= σµ
√
1− 2k
9
2Σ0
, β˜2 =
1
3λ˜2
= σµ
√
3− 4k
9
2Σ0
,
Σ˜1 =
Σ0
3− 4k
9
,
and the k
.
= λ1
λ2
satisfies: 4k3 − 27k2 − 18k + 81 = 0, so k = 6.9790,−1.8218, or 1.5927. By
the second order condition we have λ1 > 0, so k must satisfy 0 < k < 4.5. So k = 1.5927.
Let the M in Proposition 1.2 equal 2, we have
λ1 =
√
Σ0
3σµ
√
5
, λ2 =
√
Σ0
3σµ
√
5
,
βi1 =
3σµ
√
5
10
√
Σ0
, βi2 =
σµ
√
5√
Σ0
,
Σ1 =
1
10
Σ0.
So, it is easy to get
λ1
λ˜1
=
√
Σ0
σµ
√
5
× σµ(3−
4k
9
)√
2Σ0(1− 2k9 )
≈ 2.39√
6.5
< 1,
λ2
λ˜2
=
√
Σ0
3σµ
√
5
× 3σµ(3−
4k
9
)√
2Σ0
≈
√
2.3√
10
< 1,
βi1
β˜1
=
3σµ
√
5
10
√
Σ0
×
√
2Σ0
σµ
√
1− 2k
9
≈ 3√
7.4
> 1,
βi2
β˜2
=
σµ
√
5√
Σ0
×
√
2Σ0
σµ
√
3− 4k
9
≈
√
10√
2.3
> 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Applying the principal of backward induction, we can write
the insider i’s last period (Nth period) optimization problem for given xi1, · · · , xi,N−1, p∗1, · · · , p∗N−1
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as xiN ∈ argmaxxE[x(v − pN)|xj1, · · · , xj,N−1, 1 ≤ j ≤M, p∗1, · · · , p∗N−1, v], where
E[x(v − pN)|xj1, · · · , xj,N−1, 1 ≤ j ≤M, p∗1, · · · , p∗N−1, v]
=E[x(v − p∗N−1 − λNx− λN(M − 1)x¯iN )|xj1, · · · , xj,N−1, 1 ≤ j ≤M, p∗1, · · · , p∗N−1, v]
=x[v − p∗N−1 − λNx− λN(M − 1)x¯iN ],
in the above x¯iN represents the particular informed trader’s conjecture of the average of
the other informed traders’ strategies, i.e. x¯iN =
1
M−1E[
∑
j 6=i xjN |xj1, · · · , xj,N−1, 1 ≤ j ≤
M, p∗1, · · · , p∗N−1, v]. By the first order condition we can have
v − p∗N−1 − 2λNxiN − λN(M − 1)E[
∑
j 6=i
xjN |xj1, · · · , xj,N−1, 1 ≤ j ≤M, p∗1, · · · , p∗N−1, v] = 0.
By the theory of solving linear equations, we know x1N = x2N = · · · = xMN , x¯iN = xiN , and
xiN =
1
(M+1)λN
(v − p∗N−1). So,
βiN =
1
(M + 1)λN
,
and
E(piiN |xi1, · · · , xi,N−1, p∗1, · · · , p∗N−1, v)
=max
x
E[x(v − pN)|xi1, · · · , xi,N−1, p∗1, · · · , p∗N−1, v]
=xiN (v − p∗N−1 − λNMxiN )
=
1
(M + 1)λN
(v − p∗N−1)[v − p∗N−1 −
M
(M + 1)
(v − p∗N−1)]
=
1
(M + 1)2λN
(v − p∗N−1)2,
which implies αN−1 = 1(M+1)2λN , δN−1 = 0. By the market efficient condition we can have
λN =
βiNΣN−1
β2
iN
ΣN−1+σ2µ
, i.e., λN =
√
MΣN−1
(M+1)σµ
.
Now make the inductive hypothesis that for constants αn and δn
E(pii,n+1|p∗1, · · · , p∗n, p1, · · · , pn, v) = αn(v − p∗n)2 + δn. (5.52)
Since piin is given recursively by piin = (v − pn)xin + pii,n+1, we obtain
E(pii,n|p∗1, · · · , p∗n−1, p1, · · · , pn−1, v)
=max
x
E{(v − pn)x+ αn(v − p∗n)2 + δn|p∗1, · · · , p∗n−1, p1, · · · , pn−1, v}.
(5.53)
In a linear equilibrium, pn and p
∗
n are given by
pn = p
∗
n−1 + λnyn, (5.54)
p∗n = p
∗
n−1 + γnxn. (5.55)
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Now, xn can be written as xin+(M −1)x¯in, where x¯in represents the particular informed
trader’s conjecture of the average of the other informed traders’ strategies, so we have
E(pii,n|p∗1, · · · , p∗n−1, p1, · · · , pn−1, v)
=max
x
E{(v − p∗n−1 − λnyn)x+ αn(v − p∗n−1 − γnxn)2 + δn|p∗1, · · · , p∗n−1, p1, · · · , pn−1, v}
=max
x
{(v − p∗n−1 − λnx− λn(M − 1)x¯in)x+ αn(v − p∗n−1 − γnx− γn(M − 1)x¯in)2
+ δn}.
(5.56)
By the first order condition, we can get
v − p∗n−1 − 2λnxin − λn(M − 1)x¯in − 2γnαn[v − p∗n−1 − γnxin − γn(M − 1)x¯in] = 0, (5.57)
and the second order condition is
λn ≥ 2γ
2
nαnM
(M + 1)
. (5.58)
Using the strategy symmetry for each insider again, we have x¯in = xin. (5.57) can be
rewritten as
(1− 2γnαn)(v − p∗n−1) + [2γ2nαnM − (M + 1)λn]xin = 0. (5.59)
Since the insider must be willing to play a mixed strategy, xin = βin(v − p∗n−1) + zn, and
zn is independent with v − p∗n−1, we have the following two equations by substituting the
expression of xin into (5.59),
1− 2γnαn = 0, (5.60)
2γ2nαnM − (M + 1)λn = 0. (5.61)
Using xin = βin(v − p∗n−1) + zn again, we get
E(pii,n|p∗1, · · · , p∗n−1, p1, · · · , pn−1, v)
=E{[v − p∗n−1 − λnMβin(v − p∗n−1)− λnMzn − λnµn][βin(v − p∗n−1) + zn]
+ αn[v − p∗n−1 − γnMβin(v − p∗n−1)− γnMzn]2 + δn|p∗1, · · · , p∗n−1, p1, · · · , pn−1, v}
=[βin(1− λnMβin) + αn(1− γnMβin)2](v − p∗n−1)2 + αnγ2nM2σ2zn − λnMσ2zn + δn,
(5.62)
so,
αn−1 = βin(1− λnMβin) + αn(1− γnMβin)2, (5.63)
δn−1 = αnγ
2
nM
2σ2zn − λnMσ2zn + δn.
By (5.60) and (5.61) we get
δn−1 =
M − 1
2(M + 1)
M2γnσz2n + δn, (5.64)
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(5.63) and (5.64) are just (2.26) and (2.27).
Now by the market efficient condition we get
pn − p∗n−1 =E(v − p∗n−1|y1, · · · , yn, p∗1, · · · , p∗n−1, p1, · · · , pn−1)
=E[v − p∗n−1|Mβin(v − p∗n−1) +Mzn + µn].
(5.65)
By Lemma 5.1 we have
λn =
MβinΣn−1
M2β2inΣn−1 +M2σ2zn + σ
2
µ
. (5.66)
Using the same method, we get the expression of γn as
γn =
MβinΣn−1
M2β2inΣn−1 +M2σ2zn
. (5.67)
From the equation (5.60) and (5.61) it is easy to get that λn =
Mγn
M+1
. Combining the equation
(5.66) and (5.67), we have
M2β2inΣn−1 +M
2σ2zn = Mσ
2
µ. (5.68)
Now we consider Σn, the measure of the informativeness of price,
Σn =V ar(v|x1, · · · , xn, p1, · · · , pn−1, p∗1, · · · , p∗n−1)
=V ar(v − p∗n−1|Mβin(v − p∗n−1) +Mzn),
(5.69)
using Lemma 5.1 again, we have
Σn =Σn−1 − M
2β2inΣ
2
n−1
M2β2inΣn−1 +M2σ2zn
=Σn−1 − (M + 1)
2
M
λ2nσ
2
µ.
(5.70)
The equation αn =
1
2γn
= M
2(M+1)λn
implies
λn =
M
2(M + 1)αn
. (5.71)
Now we only need to prove the expressions of βin and σ
2
zn
.
(5.66) and (5.68) yield λn =
MβinΣn−1
(M+1)σ2µ
, thus
βin =
λn(M + 1)σ
2
µ
MΣn−1
. (5.72)
Combining (5.68) and (5.72), we get the expression of σ2zn as
σ2zn =
1
M
(
σ2µ −
λ2n(M + 1)
2σ4µ
MΣn−1
)
. (5.73)
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Next we prove that the difference equation system consisted by equation (5.63), (5.64),
(5.70), (5.71), (5.72) and (5.73) has a unique solution. We suppose that λn =
√
Σn−1
(M+1)σµ
an,
where an is a function of n. In turn, (5.70) reduces to
Σn =
(
1− a
2
n
M
)
Σn−1. (5.74)
From this equation, we have 0 < an <
√
M (n = 1, · · · , N − 1), and aN =
√
M . Then , it is
easy to get
αn =
M
2(M + 1)λn
=
Mσµ
2
√
Σn−1an
, (5.75)
βin =
anσµ
M
√
Σn−1
. (5.76)
Then (5.63) yields
M
2an−1
√
Σn−2
=
2(M + 1)(1−M)a2n + (M − 1)a4n +M2(M + 1)
2M(M + 1)an
√
Σn−1
. (5.77)
Substituting Σn−1 =
(
1− a2n−1
M
)
Σn−2 into the above equation we get
√
M(M − a2n−1)
2an−1
=
(1−M)an
M
+
(M − 1)a3n
2M(M + 1)
+
M
2an
. (5.78)
Because 0 < an <
√
M(n = 1, · · · , N − 1), aN =
√
M , the above equation is equivalent to
the following equation
an−1 =
(
M4(M + 1)2a2n
M3(M + 1)2a2n + [2(M + 1)(1−M)a2n + (M − 1)a4n +M2(M + 1)]2
) 1
2
. (5.79)
From this equation we can know that every an exists and is unique for given aN =
√
M .
Therefore, the difference equation system has a unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 3.1: By equation (5.79), we have
a2n−1
a2n
=
M4(M + 1)2
M3(M + 1)2a2n + [2(M + 1)(1−M)a2n + (M − 1)a4n +M2(M + 1)]2
. (5.80)
Because
M3(M + 1)2a2n + [2(M + 1)(1−M)a2n + (M − 1)a4n +M2(M + 1)]2
=M4(M + 1)2 + (M + 1)2(4M2 − 3M3)a2n + 2M2(M2 − 1)a4n
+ [2(M + 1)(1−M)a2n + (M − 1)a4n]2.
(5.81)
Let bn = a
2
n, we have
a2n−1
a2n
=
M4(M + 1)2
M4(M + 1)2 + F (bn)
, (5.82)
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where F (x) satisfies
F (x) =x
{
(M + 1)2(4M2 − 3M3) + 2M2(M2 − 1)x+ x[2(M + 1)(1−M) + (M − 1)ax]2}
=x
{
(M − 1)2x3 − 4(M + 1)(M − 1)2x2 + (M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4)x+ (M + 1)2(4M2 − 3M3)} .
(5.83)
It is easy to get that F (M) = 4M2.
Now, for any fixed N , we prove
a2n−1
a2n
≤ 1. Let
f(x)
.
= (M − 1)2x3 − 4(M + 1)(M − 1)2x2 + (M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4)x+ (M + 1)2(4M2 − 3M3),
(5.84)
so
f ′(x) = 3(M − 1)2x2 − 8(M + 1)(M − 1)2x+ (M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4). (5.85)
Let f ′(x) = 0, since the ∆ of the above quadratic equation is
∆ =64(M + 1)2(M − 1)4 − 12(M − 1)2(M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4)
= 8(M − 1)2(M2 − 1)(−M2 − 2) < 0,
(5.86)
so for any x, f(x) is increasing. On the other hand, f(0) = (M + 1)2(4M2 − 3M3) < 0,
f(M) = 4M > 0, so f(x) have a unique solution in (0,M), we denote the solution is A.
If for any n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, a2n ∈ [A,M), by
a2n−1
a2n
=
M4(M + 1)2
M4(M + 1)2 + a2nf(a
2
n)
, (5.87)
and f(a2n) > 0, we have
a2n−1
a2n
≤ 1, then the proposition is proved.
So we only need to prove that for any n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, a2n ∈ [A,M). In order to prove
this conclusion, we fist give the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. The real root of f(x) = 0, denoted by A, satisfies
A ∈
(
M − 4M
(M − 1)(M3 + 3M2 + 4M − 4) ,M −
4M
M2(M + 1)2 + 4
)
. (5.88)
Proof. : From aN =
√
M and equation (5.79), we have
aN−1 =
√
M3(M + 1)2
M2(M + 1)2 + 4
. (5.89)
In order to get the range of A, we first compute f(M − ε), where 0 < ε < M .
f(M − ε) =(M − 1)2(M − ε)3 − 4(M + 1)(M − 1)2(M − ε)2+
(M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4)(M − ε) + (M + 1)2(4M2 − 3M3)
=− (M − 1)2ε3 − (M − 1)2(M + 4)ε2−
(M − 1)(M3 + 3M2 + 4M − 4)ε+ 4M,
(5.90)
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so from the above equation we have
f
(
M − 4M
(M − 1)(M3 + 3M2 + 4M − 4)
)
< 0, (5.91)
i.e.
A > M − 4M
(M − 1)(M3 + 3M2 + 4M − 4) . (5.92)
On the other hand, (5.90) implies
f
(
M − 4M
M2(M + 1)2 + 4
)
=
1
[M2(M + 1)2 + 4]3
{−64M3(M − 1)2 − 16M2(M − 1)2(M + 4)[M2(M + 1)2 + 4]
+ 32M2[M2(M + 1)2 + 4]2}
=
32M2
[M2(M + 1)2 + 4]
− 16M
2(M − 1)2(M + 4)
[M2(M + 1)2 + 4]2
− 64M
3(M − 1)2
[M2(M + 1)2 + 4]3
,
(5.93)
and
M3(M + 1)2
M2(M + 1)2 + 4
f
(
M − 4M
M2(M + 1)2 + 4
)
=
1
[M2(M + 1)2 + 4]4
[M7(M + 1)3(2M3 +M2 + 2M − 1)+
4M5(4M4 + 6M3 + 4M2 + 6M − 4)] > 0,
(5.94)
so we have
A < M − 4M
M2(M + 1)2 + 4
. (5.95)
Next we use Proposition 5.1 to prove that A ≤ a2n < M implies A ≤ a2n−1 < M . We use
the backward induction, using (5.87),
a2n−1 =
M4(M + 1)2a2n
M4(M + 1)2 + a2nf(a
2
n)
, (5.96)
i.e.
A ≤ M
4(M + 1)2a2n
M4(M + 1)2 + a2nf(a
2
n)
< M. (5.97)
By the left of the above inequality, we have
M4(M + 1)2A+ a2nf(a
2
n)A−M4(M + 1)2a2n ≤ 0. (5.98)
Let
g(x)
.
=M4(M + 1)2A+ xf(x)A−M4(M + 1)2x
=M4(M + 1)2A+ AF (x)−M4(M + 1)2x.
(5.99)
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It is easy to get that g(0) = M4(M + 1)2A > 0, g(A) = 0. By Proposition 3.1, we get
g(M) =M4(M + 1)2A+Mf(M)A −M4(M + 1)2M
=A[M4(M + 1)2 + 4M2]−M4(M + 1)2M < 0.
(5.100)
So if we can prove that g(x) is decreasing in [0,M), we can get the conclusion that
A ≤ a2n < M ⇔ (5.98). (5.101)
Next we prove g(x) is decreasing in [0,M). Since
g′(x) = AF ′(x)−M4(M + 1)2, (5.102)
from equation (5.83), we have
F ′(x) =4(M − 1)2x3 − 12(M + 1)(M − 1)2x2 + 2(M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4)x+
(M + 1)2(4M2 − 3M3),
(5.103)
F ′′(x) = 12(M − 1)2x2 − 24(M + 1)(M − 1)2x+ 2(M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4). (5.104)
Let F ′′(x) = 0, since the ∆ of the quadratic equation is
∆ =24× 24(M + 1)2(M − 1)4 − 96(M − 1)2(M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4)
=96(M − 1)2[6(M + 1)2(M − 1)2 − (M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4)]
=− 192(M − 1)2(M2 − 1) < 0.
(5.105)
So for all x ∈ [0,M), F ′′(x) > 0, i.e. F ′(x) is a strictly increasing function in [0,M). By
equation (5.103) we have,
F ′(M) =4(M − 1)2M3 − 12(M + 1)(M − 1)2M2 + 2(M2 − 1)(6M2 − 4)M+
(M + 1)2(4M2 − 3M3)
=M5 + 2M4 +M3 − 8M2 + 8M.
(5.106)
So
g′(x) =AF ′(x)−M4(M + 1)2
<AF ′(M)−M4(M + 1)2
<M6 + 2M5 +M4 − 8M3 + 8M2 −M6 − 2M5 −M4
=− 8M3 + 8M2 < 0.
(5.107)
That means g(x) is decreasing in [0,M). Then we prove Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Given t ∈ (0, 1), choose N1 < N2 < · · · < Nj < · · · → +∞
satisfy 2 + (1− t)Nj ≤ (1− t)Nj+1 < Nj − 1, j = 1, 2, · · · . For every Nj, let n(Nj) = [tNj ],
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j = 1, 2, · · · . ByNj+1 > Nj and (1−t)(Nj+1−Nj) ≥ 2, it is easy to get that n(Nj+1) > n(Nj),
n(Nj+1) > Nj+1−Nj . For the market having Nj auctions, we denote a(Nj)m (m = 1, 2, · · · , Nj)
the sequence defined by (5.79). So a
(Nj)
Nj
= a
(Nj+1)
Nj+1
=
√
M . By (5.79), it is easy to get:
a
(Nj)
Nj−l = a
(Nj+1)
Nj+1−l, l = 0, 1, · · · , Nj.
So
a
(Nj+1)
k = a
(Nj)
k−(Nj+1−Nj), (∀k = Nj+1 −Nj , · · · , Nj+1),
and
a
(Nj+1)
n(Nj+1)
= a
(Nj )
n(Nj+1)−(Nj+1−Nj).
Moreover, (1 − t)Nj+1 < Nj − 1 implies n(Nj) ≥ n(Nj+1) − (Nj+1 − Nj). So, according
to Proposition 5.1 in Section 5 and Proposition 3.1 we know that, A ≤ a(Nj+1)
n(Nj+1)
≤ a(Nj)
n(Nj)
.
Hence, when j →∞ the limit of a(Nj)
n(Nj)
exists, and denote it by a. Furthermore,by a
(Nj)
n(Nj)
≤
a
(Nj)
n(Nj)−1 = a
(Nj−1)
n(Nj)−(Nj−Nj−1) ≤ a
(Nj−1)
n(Nj−1)
, we know that a
(Nj)
n(Nj)−1 also converges to a as j → +∞.
By (5.87), a2 is just the real root of f(x) = 0 in [A,M), i.e. a2 = A, where f(x) is defined
by (5.84).
(i) When M = 1, (5.79) is reduce to an−1 =
√
a2n
a2n+1
and aN = 1. It is easy to get, for any
fixed Nj, and n = 1, · · · , Nj, a2n = 1Nj−n+1 . By (5.74),
Σn =
Nj − n
Nj − n+ 1Σn−1 =
Nj − n
Nj
Σ0
i.e. Σn − Σn−1 = −Σ0Nj . It is just the results of Proposition 4 in Hudart, Hughes and Levine
(2001). Since
Σ
(Nj)
n(Nj)
=
Nj − n(Nj)
Nj
Σ0 =
Nj − [tNj]
Nj
Σ0,
Σ
(Nj)
n(Nj)
converges to Σt when j →∞, where Σt = (1−t)Σ0. By λn =
√
Σn−1an
(M+1)σµ
, we get λ
(Nj)
n(Nj)
=√
Σ0
Nj
→ 0, when j → +∞. So, λt = 0. Combing Σ(Nj)n(Nj)−1 =
Nj−n(Nj)+1
Nj
Σ0 =
Nj−[tNj ]+1
Nj
Σ0
and (5.72), we get βit = 0.
(ii) When M ≥ 2, we will first prove that Σ(Nk)
n(Nk)
and Σ
(Nk)
n(Nk)−1 converge to the same limit,
and we denote it as Σt. Since when k → +∞ , a(Nk)n(Nk) →
√
A and Σ
(Nk)
n(Nk)
satisfy
Σ
(Nk)
n(Nk)
=

1− a(Nk)n(Nk)
2
M

Σ(Nk)
n(Nk)−1, (5.108)
33
we have
Σ
(Nk)
n(Nk)
=
n(Nk)∏
i=1
(
1− a
(Nk)
i
2
M
)
Σ0
≤
(
1− a
(Nk)
1
2
M
)[tNk]
Σ0
≤
(
1− A
M
)[tNk]
Σ0.
(5.109)
In the same way, by a
(Nk)
n(Nk)
2 → A < M , we have
Σ
(Nk)
n(Nk)
=
n(Nk)∏
i=1
(
1− a
(Nk)
i
2
M
)
Σ0
≥

1− a(Nk)n(Nk)
2
M


[tNk]
Σ0
≥
(
1− A
M
+ o(1)
)[tNk ]
Σ0 → 0.
(5.110)
Combing (5.109) and (5.110) we have the (3.35), and when j → +∞, Σ(Nk)
n(Nk)
→ Σt = 0.
Combing with (5.108), we have, when j → +∞, Σ(Nj)
n(Nj)−1 also converges to Σt.
By
λ
(Nj)
n(Nj)
=
√
Σ
(Nj )
n(Nj )−1
2σµ
a
(Nj )
n(Nj)
we get that λt = 0, αt =
M
2(M+1)λt
= +∞. And it is easy to get δt = γt = 0, βit = +∞
σ2zt =
σ2µ
M
(1− A
M
). Then Theorem 3.1 is proved.
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